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Abstract 
The field of behavioral finance has seen incredible growth over the past half century as it 
has explored the effect that cognitive psychological biases can have on investors’ 
financial decisions.  Behavioral finance stands in stark contrast to the efficient market 
hypothesis, as it attributes market inefficiencies to investors who are not perfectly 
rational human beings.  It offers a solution to the observed 3.5% gap that active equity 
investors miss out on in the market compared to passive index funds, which it attributes 
to their emotions and psychological biases.  These common human biases can be grouped 
into five major categories: heuristics, prospect theory, overconfidence, misperceiving 
randomness, and herding.  This thesis will conclude with applications drawn from the 
field of behavioral finance that can be applied to both the individual investor and the 
financial advisor to help achieve better investment returns. 
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Behavioral Finance and Its Impact on Investing 
 Over the past three decades, the field of behavioral finance has grown immensely 
in its use to help people make better decisions about their investments (Hirshleifer, 2015).  
Simply put, behavioral finance adds a human element to investing in its effort to more 
accurately describe an individual’s investment decisions (Thaler, 1999).  It achieves this 
by applying the field of psychology to people’s decisions regarding their finances with a 
focus on people’s individual-level cognitive biases (Hirshleifer, 2015).  Warren Buffett 
explained, “The stock doesn’t know you own it.  You have feelings about it, but it has no 
feelings about you.  The stock doesn’t know what you paid.  People shouldn’t get 
emotionally involved in their stocks” (Jordan, Miller, & Dolvin, 2015, p. 260).  In order 
to take full advantage of the study of behavioral finance, one must understand its history, 
its specific psychological traps, and how to fully apply its strategies when making 
investment decisions. 
The History of Behavioral Finance 
The Efficient Market Hypothesis 
 In order to understand the beginnings of behavioral finance, one must first look at 
the efficient market hypothesis (EMH) proposed by Fama (1965), as behavioral finance 
later grew as a contrarian viewpoint to the EMH.  Fama (1965) posited the idea that 
stocks operate in an efficient market where given the available information, stock prices 
very accurately display the intrinsic value of the stock, and once new information enters 
the fold, stock prices react almost instantaneously.  One complementary proposition to 
the EMH was the random walk hypothesis (RWH), which speculated that the future price 
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levels of a stock were no more predictable than a series of random numbers (Fama, 
1965).  The major implication that Fama (1965) originally drew from the EMH and RWH 
was that the past could not be used to predict the future of a stock’s price in any 
meaningful way.  Thus, he deemed the investing discipline of “chart reading” and trying 
to predict future prices based off of past trends completely irrelevant (1965). 
 Fama (1970) continued his seminal work in the EMH with its core concepts that 
market prices fully reflect all available information, and as a result, stocks always trade at 
their fair value.  Fama (1970) proposed a threefold approach to the EMH where each 
layer built upon the concepts in the previous layer to make a wider claim.  The first form 
of the EMH was the weak form, which presumed that future stock prices cannot be 
predicted by analyzing past stock prices (1970).  This was consistent with Fama’s (1970) 
earlier works and he found very strong support for the weak form in his analysis of the 
stock market.  The second form, the semi-strong form, proposed the idea that stock prices 
adjust rapidly to new information and in an unbiased manner, leaving practically no 
opportunity for the investor to beat the market (1970).  Fama, Fisher, Jensen, and Roll 
(1969) supported this semi-strong form with their finding that information involving 
stock splits, such as future firm dividend payments, are already incorporated into the 
stock leading up to the split, reinforcing the idea that stock prices rapidly adjust to new 
information.  The third and most audacious form of the EMH was the strong form, which 
posited the idea that stock prices not only reflect all public information, but also all 
private information, implying that there would be no competitive advantage to insider 
trading (1970).  Fama (1970) found reasonable support for all three forms of the EMH, 
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and believed that the EMH model held up very well as a suitable description of the stock 
market. 
 Throughout the 1970s, the EMH, specifically its weak form and semi-strong form, 
was widely respected and taken for granted by most of the investment community 
(Shiller, 2003).  At the core of the EMH laid the assumption that speculative asset prices 
of individual securities always incorporate the best information about the stock’s 
fundamental values, and that all price changes are simply caused by this good 
information being digested by rational investors (Shiller, 2003).  However, Kahneman 
and Tversky (1979) first challenged the EMH through their blockbuster report on 
prospect theory, which began to look specifically at how people choose between two 
different outcomes that involve risk, with the probabilities of the outcomes known.  
Specifically, their paper offered prospect theory as an alternative to the widely held 
expected utility theory as they found people often weight alternatives incorrectly when 
dealing with risk (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979).  They found one common problem 
people have in their approach to analyzing risk is a propensity to be risk-averse in their 
financial decisions, with one example of this being the popularity of insurance 
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1979).  This was one of the first studies that opened up the 
possibility of human psychological biases interfering with their financial decisions. 
The 1980s 
 Thaler (1980) built upon the findings of Kahneman and Tversky as he critiqued 
the prevalent economic theory of his time that attempted to portray how consumers made 
their purchasing decisions.  The prevailing theory of the time was the rational 
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maximizing model, which put forth the idea that consumers take all of the available 
information for a purchasing decision and make the most rational decision to best serve 
their interests (Thaler, 1980).  In essence, the rational maximizing model described how 
customers should choose, and in Thaler’s (1980) belief, falsely made the jump that this is 
in actuality how customers do choose in real life.  Thaler (1980) identified several 
observable decision-making mistakes people make such as underweighting opportunity 
costs, failing to ignore sunk costs, and regret aversion.  At this point, the field of 
behavioral finance was born.  
 Thaler and De Bondt (1985) partnered to look at whether the stock market 
overreacted, and hypothesized that an individual’s cognitive bias could produce a 
predictable mispricing of equities in the New York Stock Exchange.  They applied the 
field of experimental psychology’s finding that people oftentimes overreact to 
unexpected and dramatic news events to portfolio returns (Thaler & De Bondt, 1985).  
Their findings supported their hypothesis with the discovery that portfolios of prior 
“losers” consistently outperform portfolios of prior “winners,” indicating that people do 
in fact overreact to bad news, and let that overreaction greatly affect their investment 
decisions (Thaler & De Bondt, 1985). Psychologists Andreassen and Kraus (1988) 
further challenged the EMH by showing that when people are shown a sequence of 
historical stock prices, they tend to extrapolate past prices when a trend appears and let 
that have an impact on their investment decisions.  For example, if the study 
preconditioned its subjects by showing them past bubbles of the value of an index, the 
subjects would then form an expectation of new repeating bubbles in the future 
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(Andreassen & Kraus, 1988).  The 1980’s were a very important time where several 
studies began to cause investors to question the prevailing certainty of the validity of the 
EMH. 
The 1990s 
 The research constructed in the 1990s built upon the progress of the previous 
decade to bring behavioral finance into the mainstream, especially in academics.  
According to Shiller (2003), the academic discussion began shifting away from concepts 
such as time series on prices, dividends, and earnings, towards an analysis of how human 
psychology played a role in the financial markets.  In 1991, Thaler and Shiller started the 
National Bureau of Economic Research conference series centered on behavioral finance 
(Shiller, 2003).  The field of behavioral finance was progressing alongside the revolution 
occurring in psychology during the 1990s, which was bringing forth the central role that 
feelings play in the decision making process (Hirshleifer, 2015).  This progress in 
psychology paired well with the developments in behavioral finance to help apply how 
feelings could impact individual investment decisions. 
 Thaler (1999) successfully applied the findings of behavioral finance to predict 
the collapse of the Internet stock boom at the turn of the century, and blamed the widely 
held EMH that credited all investors as being rational and making unbiased forecasts 
about the future.  At the time, in reference to the lack of data on the psychological biases 
of investors, Thaler (1999) prophesied, “Until such data become available, we will never 
fully understand what I think will become known as the ‘Great Internet Stock Bubble’” 
(p. 16). He believed that the market was 20-30% overvalued and the only reason that it 
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continued to rise was because the investors who were willing to bet on a decline had too 
few dollars to prevail and influence the market, since the masses were driving up the 
prices (Thaler, 1999).  He also believed that one crucial mistake the largest investors 
made was using a rule of thumb, such as 60% dedicated to equities, for their asset 
allocation (Thaler, 1999). Thaler (1999) opined that they should have been adjusting their 
asset allocation based off of certain signs in the market that were indicating a potential 
crash.  Sure enough, the tech bubble burst in 2000, and the DJIA at one point lost over 
30% of its value.  Shiller (2003) noted that emotions were clearly tied up in this rise and 
fall of the market as investor confidence rose dramatically during the period from 1989 to 
2000.  He held that the media was spreading a false sentiment that the market would 
continue to go relentlessly upward, which the public widely consumed and believed 
(Shiller, 2003).  With the predictions of Thaler (1999) and retrospective analysis of the 
tech bubble (Shiller, 2003), behavioral finance had solidified itself as a legitimate tool to 
be used in investment theory. 
The Current State of Behavioral Finance 
 Behavioral finance identifies the potential causes of the recent stock booms and 
crashes and how they have their roots in human mistakes (Shiller, 2003).  Statman (2014) 
clarified that behavioral finance substitutes “normal” people for the perfectly rational 
people who are presupposed in standard finance.  The issue is not that normal people are 
flat out irrational; it is just that they are not completely rational, since they can be swayed 
by cognitive errors such as hindsight and overconfidence (Statman, 2014).  Thaler (1999) 
believed there needed to be a distinction between two types of investors: the perfectly 
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rational investor that does not exist, and the quasi-rational investor.  The quasi-rational 
investor tries to make good investment decisions, but can be prone to predictable 
mistakes (Thaler, 1999).  It is the quasi-rational investor that must be accounted for 
within behavioral finance. 
Challenging the EMH 
 Behavioral finance stands in stark contrast to the EMH that puts forth the idea that 
the markets always work well and security price changes always reflect genuine 
information (Shiller, 2003).  Behavioral finance offers an explanation for the observed 
market inefficiencies and cracks in the EMH (Baker & Ricciardi, 2015; Hirshleifer, 
2015).  Hirshleifer (2015) provided a good example of this by demonstrating that the 
stock price of the company EntreMed jumped 600% in a single weekend following the 
republication of news that had already been published and made available to the public 
five months earlier regarding a soon to be released new cancer drug.  This seemingly 
violated the principles of the EMH, specifically the semi-strong form, that assumes prices 
rapidly adjust to new information and accurately reflect all the public information 
available (Hirshleifer, 2015).  According to Shiller (2003), behavioral finance takes a step 
back from approaching finance from an efficient market framework and instead utilizes a 
broader perspective that incorporates the fields of psychology and sociology. 
 Statman (2014) drew a further distinction between what he called “standard 
finance” and behavioral finance (p. 65).  He held that standard finance adherents assume 
that all people are rational, the market is efficient, and the expected return of different 
investments is determined by the standard asset pricing theory, where solely risk 
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determines the differences in investment returns (Statman, 2014).  In contrast, he opined 
that behavioral finance theorists assume that people are normal, that the market is not 
entirely efficient, though difficult to beat, and that the expected returns of investments are 
best described by the behavioral asset pricing theory where the different returns of 
investments are determined by more factors than solely risk (Statman, 2014).  According 
to Thaler (2016), economics should incorporate two distinct theories: normative 
economic models should show the optimal solution to specific problems, while 
descriptive models should capture how humans actually behave. 
The Role of Emotions 
 Behavioral finance analysts look specifically at the role that moods and emotions 
can have on a person’s financial behavior (Duxbury, 2015).  There are several examples 
of people’s emotions affecting their decision making process.  Kuhnen and Knutson 
(2011) demonstrated that being in a good mood increases optimism and risk taking 
behavior.  Also, Lerner and Keltner (2001) showed that people tend to be more 
pessimistic and risk-averse when they are experiencing the emotion of fear.  Interestingly, 
psychologists have demonstrated that anger makes a person more optimistic and risk 
tolerant (Lerner & Keltner, 2001).  Humans were created as emotional beings with one of 
the ramifications being that emotions play a large role in our decision making process. 
 Statman (2014) distinguished between what investors say they want versus what 
they actually want.  He found that investors will say that they want high returns with low 
risk, but in reality they truly desire three different benefits: utilitarian, expressive, and 
emotional (Statman, 2014).  A utilitarian benefit looks at the tangible benefit that an 
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investment gives to an investor.  An expressive benefit is used to describe the impact an 
investment can have in conveying to others one’s values and status (Statman, 2014).  
Lastly, the emotional benefit from an investment answers the question how an investment 
makes one feel; for example, the difference in purchasing a socially responsible mutual 
fund versus a well-known hedge fund (Statman, 2014).  The socially responsible mutual 
fund could make the investor feel good about themselves because they are abstaining 
from investing in unethical companies, while the hedge fund could make the investor feel 
proud because of the exclusivity perceived from that type of investment.  
While there are many positive benefits towards the human aspect of emotions, 
they can have a devastating impact on one’s investment decisions.  Kliger, van den 
Assem, and Zwinkels (2014) found that an investor’s over-reactive trading is strongly 
correlated with his level of surprise in hearing investments news.  Hirshleifer (2015) gave 
the example of an investor’s feelings short-circuiting and influencing him to buy a hot 
stock because of excitement surrounding the stock or selling off a stock because of panic.  
In both of these scenarios the dictating factor for his investment decision is his emotions, 
while the investor is neglecting to do his own critical evaluation of the stocks 
(Hirshleifer, 2015; Kliger et al., 2014). 
 Statman (2014) blamed fear for causing many investors to sell as the market 
bottoms out, because their perception of risk is at an all time high, while their perception 
of return is at an all time low.  The role of emotions in investor’s decisions is probably 
most evident during the peaks and valleys of the market.  Another issue that may arise is 
an investor’s hesitancy to sell a loss on an individual security because he does not want to 
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“lose” on that stock (Statman, 2014).  A more rational approach that incorporates taxes 
would tell that investor the exact opposite, as they should be more inclined to sell a stock 
that has decreased in value to reap the benefits of loss realization, and hold onto their 
gains so that they can defer capital gains taxes (Statman, 2014).  Hirshleifer (2015) 
summarized that there are many benefits for an investor if he realizes his own emotional 
inclinations in investing, and is instead deliberate in his attempts to make decisions 
analytically instead of letting his emotions get a say in the process.  In order for an 
investor to fully capitalize on this analytical decision making process, he must be aware 
of the different traps that behavioral finance has found emotions and biases can have on 
one’s investment decisions. 
Behavioral Finance Traps 
 Beyond just emotions, there are many psychological traps that behavioral finance 
has identified which can wreak havoc on investors.  Thaler (2016) credited economic 
pioneer Adam Smith with first discovering key psychological concepts such as loss 
aversion and overconfidence.  Since Smith’s original discovery, behavioral finance has 
radically evolved and built a framework to help classify predictable investor mistakes.  
Five of the major traps that investors can fall into include: heuristics, prospect theory, 
overconfidence, misperceiving randomness, and herding. 
Heuristics 
Heuristics are shortcuts that the brain creates in an effort to simplify the decision 
making process, and are increasingly prevalent in today’s fast paced society.  These 
shortcuts can vary from being innate processes that the investor may be unaware of, or 
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consciously chosen rules of thumb to help aid in decision-making (Hirshleifer, 2015; 
Jordan et al., 2015).  Greenwood and Nagel (2009) and Malmendier, Tate, and Yan 
(2011) proved that past life experiences can greatly affect investor decisions, and 
oftentimes these past influences can unconsciously seep into an investor’s strategy by 
becoming a heuristic.  Investors can also make the mistake of easily locking into certain 
habits and relying on them without giving them much thought (Hirshleifer, 2015).  There 
are many practical benefits to using heuristics throughout life, but in the world of finance 
and investments they can have adverse consequences. 
Thaler and Shefrin (1981) discovered one of the first heuristics when they 
observed that most people automatically consume only out of their dividends and interest, 
instead of the principle of an investment.  In an effort to save time and stress on the brain, 
an investor will simply use this rule of thumb for what investment to liquidate and 
withdraw from, without giving any thought to all options at play through an analytical 
approach.  Shefrin and Statman (1984) saw this as an explanation for why many investors 
prefer investments with cash dividends.  The main cause of this can be traced back to 
their heuristics. 
 Currently, behavioral finance analysts have identified several specific heuristic 
biases that investors fall into.  Andersson, Hedesstrom, and Garling (2014) found support 
for the consensus heuristic, in which an investor believes “the majority is always right” 
(p. 227).  This shortsighted belief can cause an investor to fall into the trap of herding, 
which will be discussed in a later section.  Samuelson and Zeckhauser (1988) brought to 
light the status quo bias, in which an investor will simply take the default option among a 
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list of different options.  This topic will also be covered later in this thesis as it presents 
an opportunity for financial advisors to help their clients overcome this bias in their 401k 
allocations.  Choi, Laibson, and Madrian (2009) showed that investors could over 
extrapolate their own past investment performance in making investment decisions.  This 
causes the investor to comfort himself through naïve reinforcement that his past 
investment success will simply carry forward into his current investment decisions (Choi 
et al., 2009).  
 Hirshleifer (2015) also showed that professionals can even be susceptible to using 
heuristics.  One prevalent example he drew from was a CFO using a naïve capital 
budgeting approach such as the payback criterion and a single discount rate while 
comparing two very different projects undertaken by the company (Hirshleifer, 2015).  
Everyone can be susceptible to different heuristics that they unintentionally institute, and 
by becoming aware of their own heuristics they can make more informed and accurate 
investment decisions. 
Prospect Theory 
 Prospect theory lies at the heart of behavioral finance and is one of the main 
antagonists to the EMH.  The EMH puts forth the idea that individuals receive utility 
from their final state of wealth, and are indifferent as to how they reached that final state 
(Duxbury, 2015).  However, prospect theory flies in the face of the EMH in that its 
adherents stress that how an individual reaches that final point of wealth matters 
immensely, even if the final point of wealth is the same (Jordan et al., 2015).  The main 
thesis of prospect theory is that people tend to focus on changes in wealth, rather than 
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their comprehensive level of wealth (Jordan et al., 2015).  This can be seen by four main 
biases: anchoring, loss aversion, frame dependence, and mental accounting. 
 Anchoring.  Anchoring occurs when an investor fixates on a certain reference 
point for his investments (Jordan et al., 2015).  This investor then receives utility from 
gains and losses relative to that reference point, which oftentimes is the purchase price of 
the stock (Duxbury, 2015).  The investor will feel rewarded or punished as he anxiously 
tracks his investment relative to the reference point (Hirshleifer, 2015).  The problem 
here lies in the fact that the investor is paying too much attention to a superficial 
reference point, while neglecting to take into consideration the level of his entire wealth. 
 Sinha (2015) showed that people too often base the value of their stock off of the 
current asking price of their stock.  Not only that, but people also fail to adjust from their 
anchor set price when evaluating their options (Sinha, 2015).  This can be seen when an 
investor has held a successful stock for a long time and refuses to sell because he views it 
as a “winner” relative to the price he bought it for originally.  However, the past purchase 
price of a stock is irrelevant, excluding its tax consequences, when trying to evaluate the 
current value of a stock.  Kliger et al. (2014) offered further support by finding that 
reducing the prominence of a stock’s purchase price could have a substantial impact on 
an investor’s decision of whether or not to sell a stock. 
 Hirshleifer (2015) argued that an investor should be more concerned with where 
the stock value lies in relation to its current covariance with one’s portfolio than its 
marginal return in relation to its purchase price.  From an emotional aspect, the investor 
may be trying to enhance his self-esteem by “winning” with a stock pick (Hirshleifer, 
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2015).  There is a major jump in the investor’s utility at zero relative to the reference 
point, and part of the reason why an investor may be so prone to anchor is because of his 
hard-wired tendency to be loss averse (Hirshleifer, 2015). 
  Loss aversion.  Psychologically, people hate losing.  In fact, it could be said that 
people hate losing even more than they enjoy winning.  Doviak (2016) explained that 
when an investment is behaving as expected, an individual’s satisfaction can be measured 
by a slow, gentle, upward curve.  However, when an investment is not performing well, 
an individual’s dissatisfaction can be measured by a sharp, quickly descending cliff 
(Doviak, 2016).  Loss aversion is the idea that investment losses move an investor’s 
emotional needle more than equivalent investment gains, making investors reluctant to 
sell any investment that could result in a loss (Doviak, 2016; Jordan et al., 2015). 
 Thaler (1999) called this myopic loss aversion.  Myopic means that even 
investor’s who have long term horizons appear to care too much about short-term gains 
and losses (Thaler, 1999).  Thaler (1999) argued that losses hurt investors roughly twice 
as much as identical gains do.  On top of losses hurting, the media often preys on this loss 
aversion by causing panic as seen on financial television shows when the market is going 
down (Doviak, 2016).  Combining a short-term outlook on stocks with a focus on 
avoiding losses is a recipe for disaster in investing. 
 One ramification of this is that investors are often reluctant to sell losers and 
mentally declare those losses (Odean, 1998).  Again, from a rational tax perspective this 
does not make sense as selling winners triggers a capital gains tax while selling a loser 
can help offset the tax.  Not only does this impact average investors, but it has also been 
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shown that professional investors can exhibit loss aversion in their trading practices as 
they stay glued to a reference point for certain stocks (Hirshleifer, 2015). 
 Frame dependence.  Frame dependence is the theory that how a problem is 
described, or framed, can have a sizable impact on how an individual chooses an answer 
(Jordan et al., 2015).  Hirshleifer (2015) elaborated that two alternative descriptions of 
logically identical problems can produce two different answers from an individual.  
Oftentimes, simply highlighting a different reference point can cause an individual to 
change his answer (Hirshleifer, 2015).  One component within the web of framing is 
narrow framing, which occurs when an individual approaches a decision while isolating 
some of the factors that are important to it (Hirshleifer, 2015).  An example of this could 
be an investor looking at how a stock has performed relative to its purchase price, without 
taking into consideration the diversification it adds to his portfolio.   
 Researchers have often found within framing what they call the endowment 
effect.  Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler (1990) discovered the endowment effect in play 
when an individual prefers retaining what he already has instead of exchanging it for a 
better alternative.  One example they give is a person refusing to swap a lottery ticket for 
an equivalent lottery ticket plus some cash (Kahneman et al., 1990).  People make the 
mistake of believing what they have is inherently more valuable than an equivalent item, 
especially when someone else desires their item.  This coincides with the famous 
mathematical “Monty Hall” problem where a contestant is given three doors to choose 
from with a prize behind one of them.  The game show host then proceeds to open one of 
the doors that does not have the prize behind it, and invites the contestant to change his 
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answer to the other door.  Mathematically, the contestant has a 50% chance if he changes 
doors, but only a 33% chance if he keeps the door he previously chose (Robinson, 2013).  
However, most contestants go against rationality and keep the door they previously chose 
even though it has less of a chance of winning.  Surely the endowment effect is at play 
here. 
 Another practical example of the endowment effect is an owner of an old bottle of 
wine refusing to sell it for $200, but willing to only pay up to $100 to replace it if it broke 
(“From Psychology,” 2004).  The change here lies in the owner’s perspective of either 
getting the wine or giving it up (“From Psychology,” 2004).  A combination of the 
endowment effect and loss aversion causes the owner to mentally weight the prospect of 
giving up the wine more than twice as much as the prospect of getting an equivalent 
bottle. 
 Mental accounting.  Jordan et al. (2015) defined mental accounting as the 
tendency of investors to separate their money into “mental buckets” while treating the 
values and risk tolerances of the buckets differently (p. 261).  The critical mistake that 
too many investors make is that they fail to treat their money as fungible, and therefore 
end up violating rationality by failing to maintain a comprehensive view of all of their 
assets and desired outcomes (“From Psychology,” 2004). 
 One example of mental accounting materializing in a real-life situation can be 
seen when comparing two practically identical scenarios involving a lost movie ticket.  In 
scenario one, the moviegoer realizes she has lost her ticket upon arriving at the movie 
theater, while in scenario two, the moviegoer realizes that she has lost an amount of cash 
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equivalent to the value of her ticket at the door (“From Psychology,” 2004).  Studies have 
shown that the woman who loses her actual ticket is very likely just to go home, as she 
presumably does not want to pay twice to see the same show (“From Psychology,” 2004).  
However, the woman who loses the equivalent amount of cash consistently proceeds to 
buy a ticket at the door (“From Psychology,” 2004).  Seemingly, the first moviegoer 
placed the lost ticket in the movie theater mental bucket, and since that bucket had 
already been depleted, she was unwilling to buy another ticket.  However, the second 
moviegoer seemed to charge the lost cash to a “general revenue” mental bucket, making 
it unrelated to the ticket purchase (“From Psychology,” 2004).  This type of model has 
held true across many different platforms as people consistently treat equivalent amounts 
of value differently based off of which mental bucket they allocate that value to. 
Thaler (1999) showed another example of this with the “house money effect,” 
where it has been proven that when gamblers are ahead and “playing with house money,” 
they become much more inclined to take more risks with their money (p. 15).  Similarly, 
investors who have experienced high returns lately become much less risk-averse and 
more aggressive in their investment strategies (Thaler, 1999).  The main reason for this is 
the individual’s failure to consider money as fungible and treating money differently 
based off of how it was earned or how it was lost.  However, the way that an individual 
received the money has no effect whatsoever on the inherent value of that money, and 
therefore should not play a role in future decisions they make with that money. 
 Economists have tried to find a way to use this psychological bias towards 
people’s advantage.  Das, Markowitz, Scheid, and Statman (2011) explained how this can 
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be applied through behavioral portfolio theory.  Behavioral portfolio theory actually 
began over 60 years ago when economists Milton Friedman and Leonard Savage 
identified the simultaneous roles that people’s desires for riches and protection from 
poverty play in people’s behavior (Das et al., 2011).  Friedman and Savage found that the 
same people who buy lottery tickets also buy insurance, indicating that people tend to be 
both risk-seeking and risk-averse (Das et al., 2011).  When designing a portfolio, one can 
utilize different mental buckets by taking more risk with a portion of their money and less 
risk with another portion, provided they can take a step back beforehand and prioritize a 
comprehensive view of their total amount of assets.  This thesis will cover this further in 
a later section on how financial advisors can best institute this practice when advising 
their clients. 
Overconfidence 
 Another psychological mistake that investors frequently display materializes in an 
overconfident nature towards their own investment strategies and forecasts of the market.  
Kinari (2016) performed a study that polled investors for their forecasts of the NIKKEI 
225 over a one-day, one-week, and one-month period.  While investors varied in their 
degree of optimism or pessimism over the future of the market, the one thing that 
remained constant was their own overconfidence in their forecasts regarding where they 
saw the market going (Kinari, 2016).  Thaler and Barberis (2002) performed a study that 
tried to comprehend why people were so certain about uncertain events.  They found that 
certain events people believe will happen 98% of the time only end up happening 60% of 
the time (Thaler & Barberis, 2002).  Also, events that people are practically certain will 
BEHAVIORAL FINANCE 22 
 
never happen actually end up occurring 20% of the time (Thaler & Barberis 2002).  The 
major implication that can be drawn from this is that one reason people may be 
overconfident is that they tend to push certain possibilities to the end of their probabilistic 
spectrums within their mind, when in reality they should be perceived as much closer to a 
50/50 proposition. 
 Another cause of overconfidence is displayed in the mere exposure effect.  
Bornstein and D’Agostino (1992) found that repeated exposure to a certain stimulus 
could cause someone to like that stimulus more.  Hirshleifer (2015) took this one step 
further by claiming an increased familiarity with a certain stock can cause an investor to 
like it more, because in their mind an understanding of the stock reduces risk.  Weber, 
Siebenmorgen, and Weber (2005) agreed with this hypothesis by finding specific signs 
that an investor’s familiarity with a stock reduces the perception of risk.  Heath and 
Tversky (1991) found that people can end up betting on a matter for which they feel 
themselves to be an expert instead of taking an exactly equivalent gamble.  Kahneman 
(2011) called this the WYSIATI effect, or “what you see is all there is” (p. 86).  In 
reality, an investor’s familiarity with a certain stock has no bearing on that actual stock’s 
performance, and also does not imply that an unfamiliar stock would perform more 
poorly. 
 Odean (1998) found that this overconfidence can result in poor portfolio 
management.  One way this surfaces is when investors begin trading too much within 
their portfolio because they are confident they can pick out the winners and losers of the 
market (Odean, 1998).  However, oftentimes the stocks they end up buying do worse than 
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the stocks they sell, casting serious doubt on their investment abilities (Odean, 1998).  
Not only does overconfidence often result in poor returns, but it also reduces 
diversification, as overconfident investors are prone to place large bets on individual 
securities (Hirshleifer, 2015).  On top of this, overconfidence usually creates more 
trading activity, which causes negative tax ramifications.  Studies have shown that men, 
specifically, are susceptible to this, as they tend to be more overconfident in their trading 
abilities and trade one-and-a-half times more than women (Kliger et al., 2014; Liersch, 
2015).  When it comes to trading securities, almost all of the consequences of 
overconfidence are negative. 
Misperceiving Randomness 
 Yet another mistake many investors make is reading too much into random 
events, and concluding that there are causal factors behind these random events, which 
Jordan et al. (2015) called the representativeness heuristic.  Kahneman and Tversky 
(1979) were the first to find this representativeness heuristic at play as people tried to 
forecast future outcomes based off of mainly random past sequences.  Shiller (2003) 
added that the human mind is a pattern-seeking device, and when it comes to this 
heuristic, the mind can work against itself.  When forecasting future data based off of 
past data or graphs, the mind fails to account for the actual small probability that the 
current trend or pattern will continue (Shiller, 2003). 
 Investors also tend to put too much emphasis on recent events when forecasting 
data, which is called the recency bias (Sinha, 2015).  Thaler and Barberis (2002) showed 
that recent events could distort investment estimates among both analysts and common 
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investors.  This is especially true when good earnings news occurs and investors make 
the mistake of combining their emotions with the recency bias to invest more in the 
respective stock (Hirshleifer, 2015).  Investors usually have some combination of a 
recency bias and a law of small numbers bias, which occurs when people overweight the 
significance of small samples when drawing conclusions (Tversky & Kahneman, 1971).  
Along with relying too much on small samples, people rely too little on large samples, 
creating the perfect environment for a recent stock surge to prey on their internal 
psychological biases (Hirshleifer, 2015). 
Another psychological mistake that frequently creeps up amongst investment 
practices is the self-attribution bias (Daniel, Hirshleifer, & Subramanyam, 1998; Sinah, 
2015).  When things go well, people like to take credit for their talents and involvement 
in the success (Sinah, 2015).  However, when things turn out poorly, people tend to 
blame their bad luck or outside forces, neglecting to take responsibility (Sinha, 2015).  
This was first observed by psychologist Daryl Bem (1965) as he found that people 
attribute events that confirm the validity of their actions to their own superior ability, but 
attribute events that disprove their actions to factors such as poor luck or sabotage.  
Applying this to investments, it is easy to see why investors often take personal credit for 
successful stock picks when the entire market is going up, while at the same time shift the 
blame to certain industries or companies for stock picks that go south. 
Herding 
 Investors fall into the trap of herding by simply following what those around them 
are doing with their investment decisions (Jordan et al., 2015).  One example of this 
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appears in Jim Cramer’s TV show Mad Money, where oftentimes he will recommend a 
stock, which subsequently sees a large gain the next day (Jordan et al., 2015).  Rarely is 
Jim Cramer presenting new information to the market, but instead he is just reiterating 
information that was previously available, and investors are buying the stock because 
Cramer and those around them are buying it.  Sinha (2015) affirmed that the main reason 
investors herd is that they assume that their own information is of low quality and that 
other investors have higher quality information and thus place less weight on their own 
opinions and more weight on others’ opinions.  Venezia, Nashikkar, and Shapira (2011) 
agreed that herding is mainly a result of information availability or the lack thereof, and 
an innate distrust in one’s own information.  There is also plenty of support that herding 
is a form of social influence in humans where people desire to find things in common 
with those around them and feel better about themselves when their decisions are in 
agreement with their companions (Andersson et al., 2014; Roider & Voskort, 2016; 
Spyrou, 2013). 
 Roider and Voskort (2016) ran an experiment to try to test the theory of herding 
behavior among investors by separating out a treatment group that was given the 
opportunity to herd and a sincere group that was not.  In the treatment group, where 
investors were aware of the investment decisions of those around them, they found a 
higher inclination to herd and formulate common stock picks, compared to the group that 
was not aware of the stock choices of those around them (Roider & Voskort, 2016).  
Clearly, there is a psychological inclination for investors to give a large amount of weight 
to the opinions of those around them in their own investment decisions. 
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 Unfortunately, as Venezia et al. (2011) pointed out, there is ample evidence that 
“herding behavior” exists not only amongst common investors, but also amongst 
professionals and analysts (p. 1,608).  However, Venezia et al. (2011) did find that there 
was a lower propensity to herd amongst professional investors, which can be attributed to 
their financial training.  Nevertheless, the tendency to herd still exits amongst 
professionals, and Andersson et al. (2014) broke this into two categories: indirect and 
direct influence.  Indirect influence results from common knowledge, current stock-
picking fads, or common investment styles, and is practically unavoidable (Andersson et 
al., 2014).  Direct influence arises from the reputational costs to the professional if he 
deviates from the recommended choices by the consensus (Andersson et al., 2014).   
There is plenty of evidence that analysts are influenced as they adjust their own 
forecasts to those around them, so that if they are wrong there is no damage to their 
reputation because everyone else around them was wrong, but if they deviate from the 
pack and are the only analyst wrong, they could lose their job (Roider & Voskort, 2016; 
Spyrou, 2013).  Andersson et al. (2014) also proved that predictions by other analysts 
could cause analysts to make inaccurate predictions themselves.  On top of that, herding 
behavior is not unique to American analysts and professionals, as Gavriilidis, 
Kallinterakis, and Leire-Ferreira (2013) found evidence that Portuguese fund managers 
herd when choosing their fund’s monthly portfolio holdings. 
 Economists believe that herding has an adverse effect on the market by 
destabilizing prices and causing bubble-like episodes (Andersson et al., 2014; Spyrou, 
2013).  If many investors are making decisions similar to each other, it can create a 
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sudden and volatile shift in prices if the herd changes its mind about a certain stock or 
their confidence in the market as a whole.  Venezia et al. (2011) found that “herding 
behavior” is positively and significantly correlated with the level of volatility in the stock 
market (p. 1,608), which creates a bigger problem because Spyrou (2013) elaborated that 
investors often imitate the actions of others during times of crisis and uncertainty.  This 
creates a never-ending cycle where herding and market volatility escalate simultaneously 
as investors panic. 
Applications for Individual Investors 
 “Investing isn’t about beating others at their game.  It’s about controlling yourself 
at your own game” (Baker & Ricciardi, 2015, p. 23).  Too often, investors let the traps 
within behavioral finance manipulate them, instead of using behavioral finance to their 
advantage.  This is especially apparent when looking at investor returns compared to the 
S&P 500 over the twenty-year period from 1991 to 2011.  While the S&P 500 rose, on 
average, 7.8% per year, the average equity investor only achieved a 4.3% return per year 
over that same period (Liersch, 2016b).  This leaves a considerable 3.5% gap, which can 
be largely attributed to investors falling prey to the traps of behavioral finance. 
 The first step in using behavioral finance to an investor’s advantage is to know all 
of the potential biases (Jordan et al., 2015).  This thesis explains the major biases, which 
include heuristics, prospect theory, investor overconfidence, misperceiving randomness, 
and herding.  By being aware of the different biases that investors have fallen prey to in 
the past, an investor can better guard himself against making the same mistakes.  Also, 
investors need to be aware of the biases that those around them possess.  Investors too 
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often are naïve of an equity analyst’s monetary incentives to bias both forecasts and 
recommendations (Malmendier & Shanthikumar, 2007; Richardson, Teoh, & Wysocki 
2004). 
 Another step investors need to take is to increase their awareness of the effect that 
the emotional roller coaster of the market can have on their investment decisions.  
Renowned stock picker John Templeton once said, “Bull markets are born on pessimism, 
grown on skepticism, mature on optimism and die in euphoria.” (Brueckner, 2014, p. 31).  
When the market is peaking, investors experience the emotion of euphoria, and their 
confidence is at an all time high (Liersch, 2016b).  However, this is the point of 
maximum financial risk, and the best time to sell (Liersch, 2016b).  History is replete 
with examples proving this to be true, such as money pouring into equity-based mutual 
funds in late 1999 and the first quarter of 2000 right before the tech bubble burst 
(Malkiel, 2015).   
On the opposite end, when the market is bottoming out, investors begin to 
experience the emotions of panic and depression and switch their allocations out of 
equities, even though this is the point of maximum financial opportunity (Liersch, 2016b; 
Malkiel, 2015).  Investors demonstrated this by pulling out enormous amounts of money 
in the valleys of the tech and housing financial crises in 2002 and 2009 respectively, 
causing investors to miss out on the subsequent strong rebounds of the market (Malkiel, 
2015).  The key for an investor trying to control his emotions in volatile markets is to 
take an objective, contrarian mindset, and attempt to view stock prices through the lens of 
“expensive” or “cheap.” 
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 Several practical steps can be gleaned from behavioral finance that an investor 
can apply in his everyday trading habits.  Jones (2012) recommended that investors stop 
chasing past performance, and instead start choosing investments based off of relevant, 
predictive information.  Also, investors should purposely disregard the original purchase 
price of a stock when deciding whether or not to sell it, with the only exception being the 
consideration of its tax consequences (Jones, 2012).  Additionally, investors should be 
more deliberate in basing their decisions off of checklists and rules, with less reliance on 
their own intuition or “gut feeling” (Jones, 2012).  Jordan et al. (2015) suggested more 
practical steps such as creating objective investment criteria to guide the investment 
decision making process, diversifying one’s portfolio, and avoiding situations that can 
have an undue psychological influence, such as watching too much financial news 
television.  By being aware of the different traps in behavioral finance, controlling the 
influence of one’s emotions, and taking practical steps to reduce biases, one can utilize 
the study of behavioral finance to make better investment decisions. 
Applications for Financial Advisors 
 The study of behavioral finance is a valuable tool for financial advisors to better 
understand and implement recommendations for their clients.  Understanding the 
behavioral pattern and psychology of a client can make the financial advisor more 
effective and strengthen the client-advisor relationship (Baker & Ricciardi, 2015; 
Pompian, 2012).  Baker and Ricciardi (2015) found that understanding client factors such 
as personality traits, demographics, socioeconomic influences, religion, risk-taking 
BEHAVIORAL FINANCE 30 
 
history, and cognitive and emotional biases could all affect a client’s reasoning for 
financial and investing decisions. 
Understanding the Client 
Financial advisors can group their clients into three main types of behavioral 
tendencies to help customize their advice to the client (Pompian, 2012).  A client who is a 
preserver is over occupied with trying to preserve his wealth, and can frequently fall into 
the trap of being risk-averse (Pompian, 2012).  A follower easily falls into the trap of 
herding because of a lack of trust in his own opinions, and because of that, frequently 
gets in on investments late and has awful timing in the market (Pompian, 2012).  An 
accumulator is a client who has had investment success in the past, and because of that, 
struggles with an overconfident, overly risky, approach to his retirement savings 
(Pompian, 2012).  Each unique type of client provides the advisor with an opportunity to 
explain how their behavioral biases are hurting their investment philosophy. 
 Another key insight that advisors should consider is the effect that age has on a 
client’s attitude towards money.  In a survey conducted in 2011, Merrill Lynch separated 
out younger investors, ages 18-34, and older investors, ages 35-64, and polled them on 
their attitude towards risk (Liersch, 2016c).  Surprisingly, 59% of younger investors 
reported themselves as conservative, while only 41% of older investors reported 
themselves as conservative towards their investments (Liersch, 2016c).  If anything, these 
percentages should be flipped, as younger investors should be more risky in their 
investments since they have a longer time horizon until retirement, while older investors 
should be more conservative as they are closely approaching retirement.  Part of the 
BEHAVIORAL FINANCE 31 
 
reason for this lapse is that older investors have the hindsight to know that in the long run 
the market produces positive returns and is a good investment, whereas younger investors 
are too focused on the recent tech and housing market bubbles that led to market crashes 
(Liersch, 2016c).  An advisor can provide value by guiding the client to choose 
investment allocations that are appropriate for their age, and helping the client realize his 
own biases that arise from his personal experiences with investing (Malkiel, 2015). 
Advising the Client 
 As most advisors likely know, clients often struggle with falling prey to emotional 
investing during turbulent times in the market (Baker & Ricciardi 2015; Liersch 2016b).  
Malkiel (2015) showed that investors are most likely to stop their contributions to their 
401k plans and IRAs during times of market pessimism.  Here is where advisors can 
provide enormous value to their clients by helping to hold their hand through volatile 
times, and to help repress the tendency for clients to let their emotions dictate their 
investment decisions.  Advisors should focus on supporting their recommendations with 
facts and evidence as they refocus their client towards an objective investment 
philosophy (Baker & Ricciardi, 2015).  If this approach proves to no avail, another 
solution an advisor can provide is to share with the client past experiences with other 
clients who let their emotions get the best of them (Baker & Ricciardi, 2015).  By helping 
clients overcome their emotions, advisors can help close the 3.5% investment gap too 
many investors miss out on (Liersch, 2016b). 
 Additionally, the general shift away from pension plans towards defined 
contribution plans provides another unique avenue for the financial advisor to bring value 
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to his client.  With the shift away from pension plans, the employee now bears the 
responsibility for making decisions on how much to save for retirement (Thaler & 
Benartzi, 2004).  Unfortunately, people usually display what Thaler and Benartzi (2004) 
called time-inconsistent behavior, as they weigh current or near term consumption much 
more heavily than long-term consumption.  Advisors can help encourage their clients to 
max out their company matching policy on their 401k, and save more now so that they 
will have a better retirement. 
 Specifically with 401ks, one problem that frequently creeps up is the status quo 
bias, which is the preference for the default option amongst a set of options (Samuelson 
& Zeckhauser, 1988).  There is a large body of evidence that investors too often will 
simply divide their retirement contributions evenly amongst the options given to them, 
without consideration for allocation and diversification (Malkiel, 2015; Thaler, 1999; 
Thaler & Benartzi, 2004).  Thaler (1999) found that when a plan adds a stock fund, 
employee allocations towards equity rise, making their entire portfolio more aggressive.  
Thaler and Benartzi (2004) called this the 1/N rule, where the investor is using a heuristic 
of evenly dividing his funds across N- the amount of different options.  The widespread 
use of 401ks gives the advisor a perfect opportunity to help explain to clients the status 
quo bias, and reallocate their 401k funds to better serve their retirement goals. 
Constructing the Portfolio 
 One of the main jobs of a financial advisor is to help construct his client’s 
portfolio.  One common portfolio mistake most clients make is that they have too much 
of their retirement savings tied up in the stock of the company they work for without any 
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superior information for why they should be so heavily invested in their company, 
resulting in a lack of diversification (Benartzi, 2001).  Investors also rarely update their 
portfolios as conditions in the market change (Choi, Laibson, Madrian, & Metrick, 2004).  
There is a clear need for help in portfolio construction, and one way that an advisor can 
do that is through helping the client create goals within their portfolio. 
 The standard mean-variance portfolio theory simply lines up an entire investor’s 
portfolio with his accepted level of risk and return (Statman, 2014).  One the other hand, 
behavioral portfolio theory embraces the human side of investing as it starts with an 
investor’s different goals and shapes the portfolio around reaching those goals (Statman, 
2014).  Fully understanding the client and his preferences such as risk tolerance, liquidity 
needs, and time horizon can help the financial advisor and client shape their appropriate 
goals, which can range from a luxurious retirement to helping fund their children’s 
education (Liersch, 2016a; Statman, 2014). 
 Once an advisor fully understands the client’s goals, he can actually use the 
behavioral finance bias of mental accounting to his advantage (Thaler & Benartzi, 2004).  
This starts by dividing up the portfolio into different mental buckets, with each bucket 
representing a sub-portfolio with its own unique goal and correlated risk tolerance (Baker 
& Ricciardi, 2015; Das et al., 2011; Statman, 2014).  Das et al. (2011) gave the example 
of separating a client’s investments into three different goals of inheritance, education 
funding, and retirement. 
Each goal would have its own allocation of funds, and differing amount of risk, 
with a client embracing a small amount of risk for his retirement, a medium amount of 
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risk for his children’s education funding, and a larger amount of risk for his inheritance 
(Das et al., 2011).  The most risky sub-portfolio, in this case the client’s inheritance, 
could be composed of mostly equity and concentrated in a few stock positions (Statman, 
2014).  On the other hand, his most conservative sub-portfolio, his retirement savings, 
would be well diversified amongst not only different equities, but also amongst the 
different asset classes in general (Statman, 2014).  Baker and Ricciardi (2015) found that 
clients are more successful in reaching their financial goals if they can designate a sub-
portfolio, such as retirement, as not to be disturbed, with another sub-portfolio that allows 
them to tinker.  Advisors can capitalize on clients’ mental accounting bias by fully 
integrating a goals-oriented approach to their portfolio construction. 
 The field of behavioral finance has greatly developed over the last half century, 
and is expected to continue to evolve in its effort to more accurately describe how people 
interact with the economic world around them.  Thaler (2016) posited that the future of 
behavioral finance should capitalize on our ever-increasing technological abilities such as 
brain imaging and artificial intelligence to better understand the psychological aspect of 
economic decisions.  Another development worth monitoring is the advancements made 
in DNA analysis that have begun to examine the links between genetics and certain 
behavior, as De Neve and Fowler (2014) found a link between credit card usage and the 
monoamine oxidase A (MAOA) gene.  With advancements in economics, psychology, 
technology, and science, the future scope of behavioral finance should both widen and 
deepen in impact. 
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 Hirshleifer (2015) proposed that behavioral finance will evolve into a newer field 
of social finance, which will look at the macro social aspect of finance, instead of the 
individual level cognitive biases that behavioral finance concentrates on.  Specifically, 
social finance studies how social linkages among people affect the flow of information in 
securities markets (Cohen, Frazzini, & Malloy, 2010; Ozsoylev, Walden, Yavuz, & 
Bildik, 2014).  One could also study the growing impact of social networks online such 
as Facebook, Twitter, and LinkedIn, and how they affect the flow of financial 
information amongst investors.  A sharpened understanding of the entirety of social 
networks could help explain where many heuristics come from, as Hirshleifer (2015) 
supposed that they are far from entirely innate.  Also, developments in social finance, 
such as the influence of the media, could help provide more detailed explanations for the 
causes of stock market bubbles and crashes, and how to avoid them in the future 
(Hirshliefer, 2015). 
 Thaler (2016) believed that the logical conclusion of behavioral finance is 
actually the end of behavioral finance.  Once everyone includes all of the factors that 
have an influence on economic behavior, then the field of behavioral finance will no 
longer need to exist (Thaler, 2016).  When economists incorporate all of the behavior that 
they experience in the real world, the word “behavioral finance” will become redundant, 
as finance will already include all of the observed behaviors that impact people’s 
economic decisions (Thaler, 2016).  However, until that day arrives, behavioral finance 
will continue to be an indispensable tool for both individual investors and financial 
advisors to better understand and interact with the economic world around them.  
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